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Sutton: The Stark Law in Retrospect

The Stark Law in Retrospect
PatrickA. Sutton, J.D., LL.Af
Well, you are notfamiliarwith the way we go about things here. But you
will have noticed the impenetrability of the official organization.
-Franz Kafka
The above extract, a bit of dialogue between an enigmatic bureaucrat and
a land surveyor uninitiated in the ways of the local governing body, taken
from Franz Kafka's unfinished last novel The Castle, is perhaps an
appropriate introduction to a discussion of the Ethics in Patient Referral Act
of 1989, commonly known as the "Stark Law," 2 seeing as much of Kafka's
work features labyrinthine prose, inscrutable authority, and abstruse
regulations administered by a vast, creaking bureaucratic machine situated
in a world that seems to operate on a peculiar sort of dream-logic.
Originally enacted in 1989, the Stark Law has evolved from its humble
beginnings as a relatively narrow proscription involving physician referrals
for clinical laboratory services to an entity in which the physician has a
financial interest,3 into a law of much broader scope, covering a wide range
of health-related services and financial arrangements, in turn spawning
numerous volumes of complex rules, regulations and exceptions in the
process, even including a rather Kafka-esque exception to the exception to
the exception.4
Today, opinion regarding the necessity for, and the efficacy of, the Stark
Law remains sharply divided, with many critics citing the difficulty in
complying with the law as their chief complaint.5 The controversy
surrounding the law prompted the American Health Lawyers Association to
The author is an Associate at Chuhak & Tecson, P.C.; LL.M. in Health Law, Loyola
University Chicago School of Law, 2010. He would especially like to thank Professor Larry
Singer for his guidance during the process of writing this article.
1. FRANZ KAFKA, THE CASTLE 232 (Anthea Bell trans., Oxford Univ. Press, 2009)
(1926).
2. The law is named after California Congressman Fortney "Pete" Stark, who sponsored
the initial bill.
3. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 1877, 103 Stat.
2106, 2236 (1989).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(b)(2) (2010).
5. Steven D. Wales, The Stark Law: Boon or Boondoggle? An Analysis of the
ProhibitionOn PhysicianSelf-Referrals, 27 LAW & PsYCHOL. REV. 1, 21 (2003).
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publish a White Paper in 2009 discussing the unintended consequences of
the legislation and lobbying the government to consider alternative
In a
approaches to addressing the issue of physician self-referral.
somewhat ironic twist, Representative Fortney "Pete" Stark, the original
sponsor of the legislation and for who it is named, recently lamented the
Byzantine turn that the legislation has taken stating, "It gave every shyster
and promoter a loophole.. .We now have to keep rewriting the laws like the
tax code."' And so, after more than twenty years since its genesis, the
question still remains: is the Stark Law good policy?
Stated another way, considering the ultimate goals of preventing the
over-utilization of medical services and protecting the Medicare program,
are the numerous phases of the Stark Law and their concomitant regulations
effective; or, conversely, has the legislation served to impede
entrepreneurialism among physicians to the detriment of innovations and
better integration in the delivery of medical treatment? This paper will
endeavor to answer the above question through an analysis of the policy
goals behind the legislation, the evolution of its regulations, its effect on
competitiveness in the field of medicine, and the ethical considerations
implicated by the issue of physician self-referral.
Part I of this paper will explore studies documenting inappropriate
physician self-referral and the legislative responses thereto. Part II will
provide an overview of the current state of the Stark Law and explore how
it operates. 8 Part III will analyze its effects upon the healthcare system and
the practice of medicine, and evaluate arguments in favor of and against
limiting the scope of the legislation. Part IV will offer some proposals that
attempt to address the problem of physician self-referral abuse, while at the
same time reducing the complexity and breadth of the Stark Law and its
regulations.
I. DOCUMENTING SELF-REFERRAL ABUSE

& THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE

"Self-referral" refers to the practice of physicians referring their patients
for medical treatment or services to an entity in which either the physician

6. Am. Health Lawyers Ass'n, Pub. Interest Comm., A Public Policy Discussion: Taking
Measure of the Stark Law (Aug. 10, 2009), http://www.healthlawyers.org/Resources/
PI/Policy/Documents/Stark%20 White%20Paper.pdf.
7. David Whelan, Stark Regrets: I Shouldn't Have Written That Law, FORBES BLOG,
(Nov. 30, 2007, 1:52 PM), http://blogs.forbes.com/sciencebiz/2007/11/30/stark-regrets-ishouldnt-have-written-that-law/.
8. The Stark Law should be contrasted with the Anti-Kickback Statute, 42 U.S.C. §
1320a-7(b), which prohibits individuals or entities from knowingly and willfully offering,
paying, soliciting or receiving remuneration to induce referrals of items or services covered
by Medicare, Medicaid or any other federally funded program and imposes criminal as well
as civil penalties for violations. See 42 U.S.C. §I 320a-7(b) (2010).
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or an immediate family member of the physician has a financial interest.9
In practice, these arrangements are typically found where physicians have
invested in non-hospital facilities such as clinical laboratories, ambulatory
surgery centers, outpatient diagnostic imaging centers and durable medical
equipment companies.o Usually, these investments take the form of either
ownership of corporate stock or partnership interests in a corporation or
partnership that operates a healthcare entity."
It has been postulated that the aforementioned types of arrangements
became prevalent in the 1980's as a result of the restructuring of payment
systems in the healthcare industry aimed at cost containment, with many
citing the advent of the Medicare program's prospective payment system
(which fixes reimbursement for particular treatments or services at a
predetermined amount) as creating competitive pressures for physicians,
hospitals and other healthcare providers to develop new strategies to raise
revenues.1 2 Additionally, as medical technology has improved rapidly in
the past few decades, the site of treatment has increasingly shifted from
hospitals to outpatient care facilities, further facilitating the rise in joint
ventures and physician entrepreneurialism.13
In a 2007 interview in which he reflected on the current state of the law
and the widespread dissatisfaction expressed by many, Rep. Stark admitted
that prior to 1989, he did not see physician self-referral as a big problem,
stating: "I didn't think there was such a big deal. So the doctors wanted to
make some extra money."' 4 Though the bill that would eventually become
the Stark Law was introduced in 1988, it was not until the Office of the
Inspector General for the Department of Health and Human Services issued
a special report in 1989 that empirical evidence suggested physicians were
abusing the referral process in order to financially benefit themselves.' 5
Additionally, Rep. Stark credits a former staffer who was both a physician
and a lawyer for providing the inspiration for pushing for comprehensive
legislation that would provide bright-line definitions and clarifications of
what would constitute an impermissible referral.' 6 It was the staffer's
9. Theodore N. McDowell, Jr., Physician Self-Referral Arrangements: Legitimate
Business or UnethicalEntrepreneurialism,15 AM. J.L. & MED. 61, 109 n.105 (1989).
10. Id. at 62.
11. Id.
12. Id at 63-64; See generally Morgan R. Baumgartner, Physician Self-Referral and
Joint Ventures Prohibitions: Necessary Shield Against Abusive Practices or
Overregulation?, 19 J. CORP. L. 313 (1994).
13. McDowell, supra note 9, at 64.
14. See Whelan, supra note 7.
15. Office of Inspector General, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Financial
Arrangements Between Physicians and Health Care Businesses, (1989) [hereinafter
FinancialArrangements].
16. See Whelan, supra note 7.
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opinion that the penalties provided by the Anti-Kickback Law, a $50,000
fine and/or five years in prison, did not provide a sufficient deterrent for
inappropriate self-referral, especially in light of the difficulties in enforcing
the law thanks to its requirement of proving intent.17
A. OIG FinancialArrangements Report
In Section 203(c)(3) of the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988,
Congress mandated the Office of Inspector General (OIG) for the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to conduct a study on
physician ownership and compensation from healthcare entities to which
they make referrals.i8 The results of this study were published in May
1989, in a report entitled FinancialArrangements Between Physicians and
Health Care Businesses. Utilizing surveys of both physicians and
independent clinical laboratories, the study first undertook to determine the
prevalence of physician financial involvement with these entities, ultimately
finding that "twelve percent of physicians who bill Medicare have
ownership or investment interests in entities to which they make patient
referrals." 9 Additionally, the study found that eight percent of the
physicians that bill Medicare have compensation arrangements such as
rental agreements, employee arrangements, consulting agreements, and
management services contracts with entities to which they refer patients.20
The bulk of physician ownership and investment, the study found, was
concentrated in the area of independent clinical laboratories (ICL) and
independent physiological laboratories (IPL) (approximately twenty-five
percent of which were owned by referring physicians either in whole or in
part), and durable medical equipment supply companies (approximately
eight percent of which were referring physician-owned). 2' While the study
focused primarily upon physician referrals to independent clinical
laboratories, another major finding of the study was that referring
physicians invest in a wide range of healthcare entities in addition to
clinical laboratories, including home health agencies, hospitals, nursing
homes, ambulatory
surgical centers, and health maintenance
22
organizations.
The second major undertaking of the study was to analyze claims
information from the Health Care Financing Administration (now re-titled
the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services [CMS]) in order to assess
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id
See FinancialArrangements, supra note 15, at 1.
Id at ii-iii.
Id. at iii.
Id
Id.
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utilization patterns and estimate the costs self-referral imposed upon the
system. 23 The conclusions were startling: 1) patients of physicians who
own or invest in ICLs received forty-five percent more clinical lab services
than average Medicare patients; 2) patients of physicians who own or invest
in IPLs received thirteen percent more physiological testing than average
Medicare patients; and 3) the costs of the increased utilization of just
clinical lab services cost the Medicare program approximately $28 million
in 1987.24
Consequently, the OIG report identified six distinct options for
policymakers and Medicare administrators in order to address the overutilization of healthcare services due to inappropriate self-referral.25 These
included: 1) implementing a post payment utilization review program by
insurance carriers for physicians that own or invest in other healthcare
entities; 2) require physicians to disclose financial interest to patients; 3)
improve enforcement of the Anti-Kickback Law; 4) institute a private right
of action for kickback cases; 5) prohibit physicians from referring patients
to certain types of entities in which they have a financial interest; and 6)
prohibit physicians from referring patients to all entities in which they have
a financial interest. 26
Influenced by this report, Congress included a provision designed to
provide limitations on certain physician referrals of Medicare patients in the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, which was passed in
December of that year to become effective on January 1, 1992.27 This
provision, commonly referred to as "Stark I", focuses exclusively on
prohibiting a physician from referring a Medicare patient for clinical
laboratory services to an entity in which the physician, or the immediate
family member of the physician, has a financial relationship, as well as
prohibiting the entity from submitting a claim for payment pursuant to a
prohibited referral.2 8 In addition to providing several exceptions to the
prohibition, the law imposed disclosure requirements on healthcare entities
concerning physician ownership and/or investment and commissioned the
Comptroller General to conduct a study on the ownership of hospitals by
referring physicians and joint ventures between hospitals and referring
physicians.29
Besides having a profound effect on the legislation, which would
23. See FinancialArrangements,supra note 15, at iii.
24. Id
25. Id. at iv.
26. Id
27. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 1877, 103 Stat.
2106 (1989).
28. Id.
29. Id

Published by LAW eCommons, 2011

5

Annals of Health Law, Vol. 20 [2011], Iss. 1, Art. 4

Annals of Health Law

20

[Vol. 20

ultimately become the first iteration of the Stark Law, the 1989 OIG study
in turn inspired several more studies on the issue of physician self-referral
by both governmental agencies and professional journals that not only
supported, but expanded upon, the OIGs conclusions.30
B. Additional Documentation of the Self-Referral Problem
and the Expansion of the Stark Law
Between 1989 and 1994, nine more influential studies examining both
the prevalence and impact of the practice of physician self-referral on the
healthcare system appeared in professional journals such as the New
England Journal of Medicine and the Journal of the American Medical
Association as well as in state and federal government reports.3 While
Stark I focused exclusively on referrals for services at clinical laboratories,
the following studies indicated not only that clinical labs were not sole area
subject to self-referral abuse, but the studies resulted in a renewed call for a
wider and more comprehensive ban on the practice of physician selfreferral.
In a 1990 article appearing in the New England Journal of Medicine, a
comparison study was performed on the practice patterns of fifteen doctors
at Health Stop, a chain of ambulatory care centers, before and after it
changed its compensation system from flat-fee to a variable salary
dependent on how much income a doctor could generate individually. 32
The study found that: physicians increased the number of laboratory tests
they ordered by twenty-three percent; the number of x-ray films per visit
increased by sixteen percent, and that total charges per month, adjusted for
inflation, grew twenty percent; leading the study's authors to conclude that
physicians indeed change the way they practice medicine when financial
incentives rewarding individual performance are introduced.33 Further
studies documented similar increases in utilization of services across a wide
variety of specializations where physicians had financial incentives to do
so.
In another article appearing in the same volume of the New England
Journal of Medicine, a similar comparison study was described that
measured the frequency of the use of diagnostic imaging as performed by
physicians who used imaging equipment in their offices and as ordered by
30. Medicare Self-Referral Laws: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health of the H.
Comm. on Ways and Means, 106th Cong. 20 (1999) (statement of D. McCarty Thornton,
Chief Counsel to the Inspector Gen., Office of the Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Health &
Human Servs.).
31. Id at 22-25.
32. David Hemenway et al., Physicians' Responses to FinancialIncentives -Evidence
from a For-ProfitAmbulatory Care Center,322 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1059, 1059 (1990).
33. Id. at 1060, 1062.
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physicians who referred patients to outside radiologists. 3 4 The study
revealed not only that self-referring physicians utilized diagnostic imaging
services at least four times more often than their counterparts who referred
to outside radiologists, but also that the charges from the self-referring
physicians were higher on average - a difference that the authors found
could not be attributed to differences in the patient mix, the specialties of
the physicians, or the complexity of the services performed.
Similar results were reported regarding physical therapy and
rehabilitation facilities in a study published by the Journal of the American
Medical Association in 1992.36 Through analyzing information from these
facilities concerning profits, charges, and utilization obtained under a
legislative mandate from the State of Florida, the authors concluded that
patient referrals were thirty-nine to forty-five percent higher in facilities
owned by the referring physician and these facilities generated significantly
higher revenues than facilities not owned by physicians.37 Interestingly, the
study also found that licensed physical therapists employed in facilities not
owned by physicians spent an average of sixty percent more time treating
patients than their peers did in facilities wholly or jointly owned by
physicians.38

Additionally, results were reported in the case of freestanding radiation
therapy centers in Florida, where the frequency and costs of treatment were
between forty and sixty percent higher when compared with the rest of the
United States where referring physicians had ownership interests.39
Similarly, California researchers found that the practice of self-referral had
significant effects on the utilization of high-cost medical services covered
under the state's workers compensation program. 4 0 In comparing the
patterns of physicians who engaged in self-referral and physicians who
referred to independent facilities, this study revealed that self-referring
physicians initiated physical therapy 2.3 times more often than their

34. Bruce J. Hillman et al., Frequency and Costs of Diagnostic Imaging in Office
Practice - A Comparison of Self-Referring and Radiologist-ReferringPhysicians, 322 NEW
ENG. J. MED., 1604, 1604 (1990).
35. Id. at 1606.
36. Jean M. Mitchell & Elton Scott, Physician Ownership of Physical Therapy Services:
Effects on Charges, Utilization, Profits, and Service Characteristics,268 JAMA 2055, 2055
(1992).
37. Id.
3 8. Id.
39. Jean M. Mitchell & Jonathan H. Sunshine, Consequences of Physicians, Ownership
of Health Care Facilities- Joint Ventures in Radiation Therapy, 327 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1497, 1497 (1992).
40. Alex Swedlow et al., Increased Costs and Rates of Use in the California Workers'
Compensation System as a Result of Self Referral by Physicians, 327 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1502, 1504 (1992).
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independent counterparts, incurred over twenty-six percent higher costs
associated with psychiatric evaluation, and ordered significantly more MRI
tests, thirty-eight percent of which were deemed by the authors to be
medically inappropriate.4 1
C. OBRA 93 & The Advent of Stark II
Perhaps the most influential study addressing the topic of physician selfreferral, published in Marc Rodwin's 1993 book Medicine, Money and
Morals: Physicians' Conflicts of Interest, which essentially argues that
physicians' financial conflicts of interest exist in every area and specialty of
medicine, and are more pervasive than commonly acknowledged.4 2 In the
foreword to the book, Dr. Arnold S. Relman, a professor from Harvard
Medical School and editor-in-chief of the New England Journal of
Medicine, states the crux of the problem:
If our health care system faces a cost-crisis - and there is nearly universal
agreement that it does - the proximate cause of that crisis must be sought
in the behavior of physicians. ..The medical care has become a
competitive, revenue-seeking industry in which many physicians have an
economic interest that goes beyond their personal services. This
development undoubtedly affects many of the decisions doctors make,
and it certainly adds to the cost of medical care.43
In April 1993, not long after the book was published, Rodwin testified
before the Ways and Means Health Subcommittee at a hearing concerning
the problems created by inappropriate physician self-referral.44 Shortened
versions of the key findings and recommendations from this testimony were
subsequently read into the congressional record on the floor of the House of
Representatives by Rep. Stark and included the following salient points: 1)
physicians' financial conflicts of interest existed as far back as the 1890's,
including kickbacks, self-referral, and ownership of pharmacies and other
medical supply businesses; 2) while other professional groups are subject to
strict conflict of interest regulations and high fiduciary standards, doctors
(with the notable exception of doctors practicing within the Veteran's
Administration) generally are less accountable to patients; 3) current laws
(e.g., Stark I, Anti-Kickback) form a patchwork of regulation that is ad hoc,
4 1. Id.
42. MARC A. RODWIN, MEDICINE, MONEY AND MORALS: PHYSICIANS' CONFLICTS OF
INTEREST (1993).
43. Id. at ix - x.
44. The Comprehensive Physician Ownership and Referral Act 1993: Hearing on H.R.
345 Before the Subcomm. on Health of the H. Comm. On Ways and Means, 103rd Cong.
(1993) (statement of Marc Rodwin, Associate Professor, School of Public and
Environmental Affairs, Indiana University).
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inconsistent, and incomplete; and 4) the current system of financing and
organizing medical care has led to uncontrolled increases in medical
spending, and provided perverse financial incentives for doctors.4 5 Further
stating that Professor Rodwin's findings are supported by numerous
published studies, cases, and financial documents, Rep. Stark concluded:
For physician self-referral, the most effective, least costly and easiest
approach is to enact a broad federal prohibition such as that proposed in
H.R. 345. Extensive monitoring of doctors through utilization review
and quality assurance programs would be very costly and not a
particularly effective way to cope with conflicts of interest. Disclosure
would do more to protect doctors than patients. Using penalties for
misconduct to deter improper actions would offer little protection to
patients because of the difficulty of detecting and prosecuting suits, and
detection would be costly, too. This holds whether the sanctions are for
violating the Medicare anti-kickback statute, antitrust laws, state laws or
other legislative and common law prohibitions. 46
Originally introduced by Rep. Stark in January 1993, H.R. 345, "The
Comprehensive Ownership and Referral Act of 1993" was designed to
make illegal any referral by a physician, no matter what the source of
payment was expected to be, to other providers with which the referring
physician has a financial relationship. 7 Citing the decision by the
American Medical Association's Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs,
which found unethical the practice of referring patients to providers with
which the physician was financially associated, Rep. Stark argued that the
only way to protect healthcare consumers from unnecessary referrals is to
impose a comprehensive, across-the-board ban on self-referral as well as
providing physicians a bright-line rule to make clear which arrangements
are not allowed.48 To this end, the proposed bill extended the ban on
physician self-referral contained in Stark I to all payers, including
Medicare, Medicaid, Blue Cross/Blue Shield, commercial carriers, and
health maintenance organizations. 4 9
Furthermore, the bill extended the ban contained in Stark I, which only
applied to referrals for clinical laboratory services, to an enumerated list of
"Designated Health Services" including: physical therapy services,
occupational therapy services, radiology services (including magnetic
resonance imaging (MRI), computerized axial tomography, and ultrasound
45.
Stark).
46.
47.
48.
49.

139 CONG. REC. E11l6, Elll6-E11l7 (daily ed. May 3, 1993) (statement of Rep.
Id.atElll7.
H.R. 345, 103rd Cong. (1993).
139 CONG. REC. E84 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1993) (statement of Rep. Stark).
Id
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services), the furnishing of durable medical equipment, the furnishing of
parenteral and enteral nutrition equipment and supplies, the furnishing of
outpatient prescription drugs, ambulance services, home infusion therapy,
and inpatient and outpatient hospital services (including rehabilitation and
psychiatric hospital services).
Despite the fact that H.R. 345 did not pass, most of the language of the
bill was subsequently adopted (albeit much diluted) in Section 13562 of the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (OBRA 93)." Signed into law
by then-President Clinton on August 10, 1993, section 13562 of OBRA 93
(Stark II) extended the self-referral ban to include the list of ten
"Designated Health Services" (DHS or DHS Services) proposed in H.R.
345 and also extended the prohibition to cover Medicaid patients, but fell
short of Rep. Stark's vision of a broad ban on the practice of physician selfreferral extending to private payors as well.52 This iteration of the law
became known colloquially as "Stark II" and marks the point at which the
rules and regulations intended to clarify the law began to be issued in
numerous phases and took on a life of their own.
In 1998, just over five years after Stark II was introduced, the Health
Care Financing Administration issued a proposed rule to revise the
regulations to cover the additional DHS services and extend the prohibition
to Medicaid patients." Public comments received in the period subsequent
to the proposed rule led to the adoption of a bifurcated rulemaking process
whereby the final rules would be promulgated in two separate phases: Phase
I primarily addressed general definitions, general prohibitions, and the
clarification of what constitutes a financial relationship between physicians
and entities providing DHS, and Phase II primarily addressed regulatory
exceptions, reporting requirements, and public comments relating to Phase
I.54 The Phase I Final Regulations were not released until 2001 ," while the
Phase II Final Regulations were not released until three years later, in
2004.6

50. Id.
51. Morey J. Kolber, Stark Regulation: A Historical and Current Review of the SelfReferralLaws, 18 HEC FORUM 61, 63-64 (2006).
52. Id.
53. Physicians' Referrals to Health Care Entities with Which They Have Financial
Relationships, 63 Fed. Reg. 1,659, 1,672 (proposed Jan. 9, 1998) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R.
pts. 411, 424, 435 and 455).
54. See 139 CONG. REC. E84.
55. Physicians' Referrals to Health Care Entities with Which They Have Financial
Relationships (Phase I), 66 Fed. Reg. 856, 856 (Jan. 4, 2001) [hereinafter Physicians'
Referrals (Phase I)] (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 411 and 424).
56. Physicians' Referrals to Health Care Entities with Which They Have Financial
Relationships (Phase II), 69 Fed. Reg. 16,054, 16,054 (Mar. 26, 2004) [hereinafter
Physicians' Referrals (Phase II)] (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 411 and 424).
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Finally, in September 2007, Phase III Final Regulations were published
which sought to address public comments received after the publication of
the Phase II rules and to reduce some of the regulatory burdens imposed on
the healthcare industry by clarifying and modifying some of the exceptions
related to financial relationships between physicians and DHS entities
where there is little risk of abuse to either the patient or to the Medicare or
Medicaid programs. 57
While the three aforementioned "phases" represent the bulk of the Stark
Law regulations, they are by no means the only official CMS
pronouncements on the legislation. Recently, changes made by CMS to the
Medicare Physician Fee Schedule and Hospital Inpatient Prospective
Payment System rules (which provide billing codes, the levels at which
particular services will be reimbursed, and other program policies) affected
significant portions of the regulations contained in all three phases of the
Stark II rulemaking.5 8 While these regulations aimed to clarify the Stark
Law as well as to close a number of perceived loopholes, the approach
taken by CMS in implementing the Stark Law can be perhaps accurately
described as ad hoc, resulting in lengthy delays, inconsistent interpretations,
and considerable trepidation on the part of a healthcare community faced
with expending considerable amounts of time and energy complying with
an ever-changing law.
II. THE CORE ELEMENTS OF THE STARK LAW'S PROHIBITION ON SELFREFERRAL

The core of the Stark Law is its prohibition on self-referral, which can be
stated succinctly as: a physician is prohibited from referring a patient for an
item or service that is included in the list of ten DHS services6o to an entity
in which the physician (or an immediate family member) has a financial
interest, unless an exception applies. 6 1 Additionally, entities providing
DHS services are prohibited from submitting any claims for reimbursement
or billing to either the Medicare or Medicaid programs, or to any other

57. Physicians' Referrals to Health Care Entities with Which They Have Financial
Relationships (Phase III), 72 Fed. Reg. 51,012, 51,012 (Sept. 5, 2007) [hereinafter
Physicians' Referrals (Phase III)] (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 411 and 424).
58. Changes to the Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment Systems and Fiscal Year
2009 Rates, 73 Fed. Reg. 48,434, 48,688 (Aug. 19, 2008) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R.41 I413, 422, and 489).
59. Irvin Wagner, The Difficulty ofDoing Business with Stark in an Ever-Changingand
Overly Complex Regulatory Environment: After Twenty Years, Where Are We Heading? 19
ANNALS HEALTH L. 241, 245 (2010).

60.
61.

42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(h)(6)a-k (2006).
42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(a)(1)(A).
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person or entity pursuant to a prohibited referral. 62 By itself the prohibition
is a fairly straightforward proposition. However, due to the fact that the
Stark Law covers all DHS referrals unless an exception applies, the chief
difficulties in achieving compliance with the statute lie in the complex,
protean definitions to terms such as "financial relationship," as well as
those terms contained in the numerous exceptions to the statute.
A. Physician
Commonly, performing a Stark analysis involves breaking down the
statute's self-referral prohibition into a seven-step inquiry. First, it is
necessary to determine whether the party making the referral is a
"physician" as defined by the regulations. For purposes of the prohibition,
"physician" means a doctor of medicine or osteopathy, dentist, podiatrist,
Providers such as nurse practitioners,
optometrist, or chiropractor.63
physician's assistants, and physical therapists are not included within this
definition. If the individual qualifies as a "physician" under the above
definition, the next necessary step is to determine whether a "referral"
occurred.
B. Referral
As provided in the regulations, "referral" includes: any physician request
(in any form, whether written, oral, or electronic) for a service, item or good
that is reimbursed under Part B of the Medicare program; a request for a
consultation with another physician, as well as all of the services ordered as
a result of that consultation; and the establishment of a plan of care using
DHS.64 While this definition does not expressly include any DHS
personally performed or provided by the referring physician, it does
implicate referrals made within a physician's group practice. 65 If the
request for services qualifies as a "referral" under the regulations, the next
determination that must be made is whether the referral is for Designated
Health Services.
C. DesignatedHealth Services
Currently, "Designated Health Services" include: 1) clinical laboratory
services; 2) physical therapy; 3) occupational therapy; 4) radiology and
certain other imaging services; 5) radiation therapy services and supplies; 6)
durable medical equipment and supplies; 7) parenteral and enteral nutrients,
62.
63.
64.
65.

42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(a)(1)(B).
42 C.F.R. § 411.351 (2009).
Id.
Id.
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equipment and supplies; 8) prosthetics, orthotics, and prosthetic devices and
supplies; 9) home health services; 10) outpatient prescription drugs; and 11)
inpatient and outpatient hospital services. 66
If the referral is for one of the services or items listed above, the next
inquiry that must be made is whether the individual being referred is a
Medicare or Medicaid patient. Despite Rep. Stark's intention that the selfreferral ban apply broadly to include private payors as well as the Medicare
and Medicaid programs, the language relating to the extension of the ban
was deleted from the OBRA 93.6
D. Entity
Additionally, it is also necessary to consider the definition of what
constitutes an "entity" (i.e., the other end of the referral), to which
physicians may not make certain referrals, as its meaning is no longer selfevident. Under the Phase I regulations, only the person or entity that
actually billed Medicare or Medicaid was considered an "entity" for the
purposes of the statute's self-referral prohibition. 68 The limited scope of
this definition led directly to the proliferation of what are known as "under
arrangements," a term which denotes an arrangement where a hospital
would contract or enter into some form of joint-venture with a third party
(e.g., a physician or physician group practice) to provide services for the
hospital that the hospital would then bill for under its provider number, thus
avoiding the Stark Law self-referral prohibition.69
CMS expressed concern over this practice in a proposed rulemaking in
2007, stating: "It appears that the use of these arrangements may be little
more than a method to share hospital revenues with referring physicians in
spite of unnecessary costs to the program and to beneficiaries." 70
Consequently, in August 2008, the agency published a revised definition of
"entity" to take effect on October 1, 2009, which expanded the term to
include any person or entity that performed DHS services that are billed as
DHS in addition to those who actually billed DHS. 7 1 The result of this
66. See Physicians' Referrals (Phase II), supra note 57, at 51,080.
67. See 139 CONG. REc. E84 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1993) (statement of Rep. Stark).
68. See Physicians' Referrals (Phase I), supra note 55, at 943.
69. Daniel Murphy, New Stark Regulation Will Eliminate Most Under Arrangements
Joint Ventures, Birmingham Medical News 13 (Sept. 2008), http://www.balch.com/lfles/
Publication/058ed7e0- 1527-4091-9736-56189d08eeb6/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/
c5872501-8efd-47f7-9f02-639fa749c49d/MurphyDM%2OUnder/o2OArrangements%20
Article%20(2).pdf.
70. Proposed Revisions to Payment Policies Under the Physician Fee Schedule, and
Other Part B Payment Policies for CY 2008, 72 Fed. Reg. 38,122, 38,186 (proposed Jul. 12,
2007) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 411).
71. See Changes to the Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment Systems and Fiscal Year
2009 Rates, supra note 58, at 48,434.
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change is that physicians or physician group practices that perform DHS
must now meet an exception to the Stark Law.
E. FinancialRelationship
Perhaps the most important concept involved in analyzing a referral
under the Stark Law is determining whether a "financial relationship" exists
between the referring physician and the entity to which the referral has been
made. Under the statute, a "financial relationship" is specified as one of
three possibilities: 1) an ownership interest; 2) an investment interest; or 3)
a compensation arrangement between the physician (or a physician's
immediate family member) and the entity.7 2 The regulations break down the
concept of financial relationship further, adding that the ownership or
investment interest as well as the compensation arrangement may be either
direct or indirect. 7 3
The regulations specify that:
A direct financial relationship exists if remuneration passes between the
referring physician (or a member of his or her immediate family) and the
entity furnishing DHS without any intervening persons or entities
between the entity furnishing DHS and the referring physician (or a
member of his or her immediate family). 74
Due to the breadth of this definition, the concept of "direct financial
relationships" is relatively straightforward and does not require overly
complex analysis. Additionally, provisions contained in the Phase III Final
Rules serve to eliminate some of the semantic differences resulting from
physician practice organizations being understood as intervening between
the referring physician and the entity performing DHS by forcing
physicians to "stand in the shoes" of their organizations for purposes of
determining whether a direct financial relationship exists. 75 Under the
Phase III Final Rule, "a physician is deemed to have a direct compensation
arrangement with an entity furnishing DHS if the only intervening
entity.. .is his or her physician organization." 7 6
On the other hand, "indirect financial relationships" can be a more
complex concept to understand and in the case of indirect compensation
agreements, involve a multi-step analytical process. Under the regulations,
an indirect ownership or investment interest exists where there is an
unbroken chain of owners between the referring physician and the entity
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(a)(2) (2010).
42 C.F.R. § 411.354(a)(1) (2010).
42 C.F.R. § 411.354(a)(2).
Physicians' Referrals (Phase III), supra note 57, at 51,028.
Id.
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furnishing DHS, and the entity furnishing DHS has actual knowledge of (or
acts in reckless disregard or deliberate ignorance of) the fact that that the
referring physician has some ownership or investment interest in the entity
furnishing the DHS." For example, an indirect ownership interest would
exist where a physician owns a physician practice group and the group in
turns owns an interest in a medical imaging company, which has knowledge
of the physician's ownership interest in the practice group.
Although they are similar to indirect ownership or investment interests in
that they involve the unbroken chain and knowledge elements as well,
indirect compensation arrangements involve a slightly more detailed and
complex analysis. Three conditions must be satisfied for an indirect
compensation arrangement to exist. First, there must exist an unbroken
chain of persons or entities that have financial relationships between the
referring physician and the entity furnishing DHS.x Second, the referring
physician receives aggregate compensation that varies with or takes into
account the volume or value of referrals or other business generated by the
referring physician for the DHS entity (i.e., the total amount of
compensation is higher or lower based on referrals to the DHS entity).79
Finally, the entity furnishing DHS must have actual knowledge (or act in
reckless disregard or in deliberate ignorance of) the fact that the referring
physician's aggregate compensation varies in the prohibited manner
described directly above.so
Arrangements between medical device
companies and orthopaedic surgeons where the device company provides a
financial interest in devices the physicians help develop often raise indirect
compensation issues. For example, physician referrals of DHS to a hospital
purchasing the devices could create an indirect financial relationship if the
entity is aware of the relationship. Furthermore, the "stand in the shoes"
provision of the Phase III Final Rules applies equally to the indirect
compensation arrangement analysis as well, with the effect that many
arrangements that were previously considered indirect compensation
arrangements will have to be re-evaluated as direct compensation
arrangements and tailored accordingly to fit within an established statutory
exception.
F. Exceptions
If it has been determined that a physician has made a referral for DHS to
an entity with which he or she has a financial relationship, the Stark Law's
prohibition on referrals applies and the final step in the analysis is to
77.
78.
79.
80.

42 C.F.R.
42 C.F.R.
42 C.F.R.
42 C.F.R.
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determine whether any exception to the prohibition exists. Generally
speaking, the exceptions to the Stark Law can be placed into three
categories: 1) all-purpose exceptions, which apply to both ownership and
compensation arrangements; 2) ownership and investment exceptions; and
3) direct and indirect compensation arrangement exceptions. As the
prohibition contained in the Stark Law, as well as the definitions of the key
terms contained therein, are relatively broad and cover most referral
arrangements involving Medicare or Medicaid patients, the exceptions have
become the focal point of the statute as well as a frequent target for critics
who cite the exceptions as proof of the Stark Law's complexity.81
Indeed, the regulations relating to the exceptions require substantial
investments of time and energy spent analyzing matters such as: whether
physicians in a group practice spend the requisite number of hours with
patients per week furnishing non-DHS services; 82 whether the amount of
space rented or leased exceeds the amount "reasonable and necessary" for
legitimate business purposes;
and finally whether any amount of
remuneration (which includes "any payment or benefit made directly or
indirectly" 84) exceeds "fair market value." 85
The general exceptions include: physician services where referrals
are between members of the same group practice;8 certain ancillary
services performed within the same office of a group practice; 87 and certain
prepaid health plans, such as HMOs.88 For physician groups, the in-office
ancillary services exception is the most commonly used exception to the
Stark Law and is also one of the broadest exceptions available. In order to
qualify for this exception, the physician must be a member of a qualifying
"group practice" 89 and must also meet various requirements related to
supervision of the physician furnishing the services, 90 the physical location
and characteristics of the building housing the practice, 91 and billing.92 If
the various requirements prescribed by the regulations are met, physicians
are permitted to furnish certain DHS services (excluding the furnishing of
some items of durable medical equipment and parenteral and enteral
81. Paula Tironi, The "Stark" Reality: Is the Federal Physician Self-Referral Law Bad
for the Health Care Industry?, 19 ANNALS HEALTH L. 235, 238 (2010).
82. 42 C.F.R. § 411.355(b)(2)(A)(2) (2009).
83. 42 C.F.R. § 411.357(a)(3).
84. 42 C.F.R. § 411.351.
85. 42 C.F.R. § 411.357(c)(2)(i).
86. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(b)(1) (2010).
87. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(b)(2).
88. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(b)(3).
89. 42 C.F.R. § 411.352 (2009) (defining group practice).
90. 42 C.F.R. § 411.355(b)(1).
91. 42 C.F.R. § 411.355(b)(2).
92. 42 C.F.R. § 411.355(b)(3).
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nutrients) in the group's office without triggering the Stark Law's
prohibition on self-referral.93
Exceptions relating to ownership or investment interests include:
ownership interests in publicly traded securities or mutual funds; 94
ownership and investments interests in healthcare facilities located in rural
areas; 95 healthcare facilities located in Puerto Rico; 96 and ownership and
investment interests in hospitals meeting certain requirements. 9 7
Finally, the direct and indirect compensation arrangement exceptions
include: the rental of office space and equipment; 98 bona fide employment
relationships; 99 personal services arrangements (used when physicians are
not employed but instead are independent contractors);100 remuneration
unrelated to the provision of DHS;'t physician recruitment activities; 102
isolated transactions (e.g., the one-time sale of a practice); o3 group practice
arrangements with a hospital subject to numerous requirements; 104 and
payments by physicians for certain items and services. 0 5
The numerous exceptions listed above serve as a major point of
contention in the debate over the effectiveness of the Stark Law, with some
critics arguing that the exceptions limit the prohibition's effectiveness and
provide loopholes through which providers can avoid the reach of the
statute by entering into indirect arrangements. 106 On the other hand, it has
been argued that it is these exceptions that make the law complex to the
point of incomprehensibility, with one critic pointing out that while the
definitions of key terms in the statute require a little over two pages, the
exceptions fill over nine pages of the statute, and in turn spawned a
guidebook for doctors and lawyers that devoted eighteen pages and over
seventy footnotes to offer clarification.' 0 7
Additionally, the changes made to the exception relating to physician
ownership interests in hospitals (commonly known as the "whole hospital
93.
94.
95.

96.
97.
98.
99.

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

42 C.F.R. § 411.355(b).
42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(c) (2010).
42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(d)(2).
42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(d)(1).
42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(d)(3).
42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(e)(1).
42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(e)(2)
42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(e)(3).
42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(e)(4).
42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(e)(5).
42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(e)(6).
42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(e)(7).
42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(e)(8).

105.
106. Anne W. Morrison, An Analysis ofAnti-Kickback and Self-Referral Law in Modern
Healthcare, 21 J. LEGAL MED. 351, 378 (2000).
107. Wales, supra note 5, at 11.
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exception") in the recent healthcare reform legislation highlight how the
Stark Law has become politicized, straying further from its purpose of
preventing fraud and abuse. Under the current law, physicians may refer
Medicare or Medicaid patients to a hospital in which they have an
ownership interest where the physician is authorized to perform services at
the hospital and the ownership interest is in the entire hospital as opposed to
a distinct part or department of the hospital. 08 Between 2003 and 2006,
due to mounting political pressure from opponents of "specialty hospitals"
(such as the American Hospital Association), Congress imposed a
moratorium on Medicare certification of such hospitals with physician
owners.1 0 9 Furthermore, the recently passed Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act significantly limits the ability of physicians to invest in
hospital facilities by prohibiting hospitals from increasing the total
percentage of the total value of ownership interests held in a hospital by
physicians as well as subjecting physician owners to a host of stringent new
requirements." 0 Also, as the provision imposes a deadline of December 31,
2010 for existing arrangements to be grandfathered in, the changes made by
this provision could very well have the effect of halting many ongoing
hospital construction projects, as well as arresting future physician
investment in hospitals."'
As noted by some attorneys in the healthcare field, the provision
discussed above has more to do with the political interests of special
interest groups rather than addressing fraud and abuse."12 One attorney
noted, "the clear intent of the provision is to maroon physician owned
hospitals in a sort of regulatory purgatory until they eventually wither away
entirely or they are purchased by non-physician owners."" 3 What is
missing from this provision is a compelling justification, as the government
has not identified any data that suggests that physicians who invest in
hospitals have a greater conflict of interest when it comes to referring

108. 42 C.F.R. § 411.356(c)(3) (2009).
109. Balch and Bingham LLP, Digging Through the Rubble: What Opportunities For
Physician-HospitalJoint Ventures Remain Standing?, 1-2, http://www.healthlawyers.org/
Events/Programs/Materials /Documents /IHCO9/legalresources/balch resource.pdf (last
visited Dec. 5, 2010).
110. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 6001, 124 Stat.
684, 685-87 (2010).
Ill. Craig A. Conway, Physician Ownership of Hospitals Significantly Impacted by
Health Care Reform Legislation, 2 (Apr. 2010), http://www.law.uh.edu/healthlaw/
perspectives/2010/(CC)%2OStark.pdf
112. Id. at 4; see also Victor Moldovan, Will Healthcare Reform Kill Surgeon
Ownership?, ORTHOPRENEUR 32-33 (Mar./Apr. 2010), available at http://www.ortho
world.com/site/docs/op/online/ 2010/marapr/editorialmoldovan.pdf.
113. Moldovan, supra note 112, at 33.
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patients than physicians who are employed by a hospital.' 14
G. Statutory Penalties
In addition to the complexity of achieving compliance with the Stark
Law, the prescribed penalties for violating it are extremely severe,
especially considering that the law is a strict-liability statute. Claims for
DHS submitted in violation of the Stark Law prohibition may trigger the
following sanctions: denial of payment;"'5 requiring amounts received to be
refunded;" 6 civil monetary penalties of $15,000 per service where the
violation is knowing;" 7 and exclusion from the Medicare and Medicaid
programs where a physician or entity has knowingly entered into an
improper cross-referral arrangement or scheme designed to circumvent the
self-referral prohibition."' 8 Furthermore, violations of the Stark Law also
potentially implicate the federal False Claims Act as Medicare providers
certify upon submitting their claims for payment that the claims are
submitted in conformity with federal law, including the Stark and AntiKickback laws."19 Thus, by submitting claims to the Medicare program that
are for services rendered pursuant to prohibited referrals, the claims are per
se false, and consequently make the claimant liable for up to three times the
amount of the claim plus a penalty of an amount between $5,000 and
$10,000 per claim.120
III. THE IMPACT OF THE STARK LAW ON THE HEALTHCARE COMMUNITY

When introducing the bill that would later become the Ethics in Patient
Referrals Act, Rep. Stark stated on the floor of the House of
Representatives that:
What is needed is what lawyers call a bright line rule to give providers
and physicians unequivocal guidance as to the arrangements that are
prohibited. If the law is clear and the penalties are substantial, we can
rely on self-enforcement. Few physicians will knowingly break the law.
The Ethics in Patient Referrals Act provides this bright line rule. 121

While the original version of the Stark Law was significantly less
complex due to the fact that it only covered clinical laboratory services, the
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. at 33-34.
42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(g)(1) (2010).
42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(g)(2).
42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(g)(3).
42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(g)(4).
See generally 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2010).
31 U.S.C. § 3729(a).
135 CONG. REc. H240-01 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1989) (statement of Rep. Stark).
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great expansion of the statute's scope as part of the OBRA 93 legislation
has turned the Stark Law into a morass of unclear, frequently changing
regulations with minimal guidance from the Department of Health and
Human Services Office of Inspector General.
In a 2003 article appearing in the University of Alabama School of
Law's Law and Psychology Review,122 Houston lawyer Steven D. Wales
compiled what amounts to an epic catalogue worthy of Homer of various
published critical reactions to Stark II, which he termed "a classic example
of a moving target;" "confusing;" 2 3 "complicated;" 24 "over-reaching, too
complex, and intrusive;"' 2 5 "out of synch with managed care;" 2 6 chilling
"legitimate and worthwhile physician participation in the competitive
healthcare
marketplace;"l27
ambiguous;12
"arcane;"l9
requiring
an exhausting
undertake
to
practices
and
physician
"institutions
internal. . .evaluation that may-even with the of intentions and efforts-be
extremely difficult to do right;" 3 0 creating "disincentives to innovate";' 3'
burdening well-intentioned business transactions with complication, cost,
and "uncertain regulatory climate";' 32 "more of a benefit to lawyers" than
an effective check on fraud and abuse;13 3 a twisted knot of legislation where
the language is so incomprehensible that regulators themselves have trouble
understanding it, let alone enforcing it;134 "strict and technical" with "so
many elements that can trip you up" and are "impossible to meet";135 with
the regulations finally being described as "heaps of words in barely
decipherable bureaucratese".136

122. See Wales supra note 5, at 23-24.
123. Ninth Circuit Clarifies Rules in Hanlester Joint Venture Test Case, 4 Health L.
Rep. (BNA) No. 15, at D-4 (Apr. 13, 1995).
124. Stark II: Health Care Groups Seek Moratorium, Major Revisions to Stark II
Legislation, 4 Health L. Rep. (BNA) No. 19, at D- 15 (May 11, 1995).
125. Id
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Molly Tschida, Stark Raving Mad, MODERN PHYSICIAN, May 1999.
129. Berkeley Rice, Does Your Compensation Formula Pass the Smell Test? This
Group's Didn't. The Doctors Were Being Paidfor Referrals to Their In-House Lab-and
Settled Chargesfor $230,000., MED. ECoN., Feb. 22, 2002, at 75.
130. See Tschida, supra note 128.
131. Id.
132. Mark Taylor, HealthcareStruggles With Stark Reality, MODERN HEALTHCARE, Jul.
5, 1999, at 30.
133. Id.
134. Lisa Pallatroni, The Language Barrier: Incomprehensible Fraud and Abuse Laws,
MED. LAB. OBSERVER, Nov. 2000, at 6.
135. See Taylor, supra note 132, at 30.
136. Michael Pretzer, The Final Word-Almost-on Self-Referral, MED. EcoN., Feb. 19,
2001, at 23.
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Today, critics still cite similar concerns over the complexity and scope of
the law, and calls for the statute to be reformed continue.' 3 1 In 2009, the
Public Interest Committee of the American Health Lawyers Association
(AHLA) published a white paper, entitled "A Public Policy Discussion:
Taking the Measure of the Stark Law," designed to provide a frank
discussion of the efficacy of the Stark Law, to assess the Stark Law's
practical impact, and "to consider what, if any, changes to the Law might be
beneficial in light of both the current structure of the healthcare delivery
system and pending healthcare reform proposals."' 38
Finding that the statute's broad scope as well as its strict liability
provisions have yielded both positive and negative results, the white paper
assessed the following as positive impacts of the law: heightened internal
scrutiny of physician financial relationships leading to the development of
corporate compliance programs and contract management systems;
restricted physician investment in free-standing imaging centers and other
providers of ancillary services prone to self-referral abuse and overutilization; and aided enforcement due to the lack of an intent requirement
in establishing a violation.' 39 Conversely, the following negative
consequences were also highlighted: complexity of exceptions and lack of a
bright line rule have driven the restructuring of the healthcare delivery
system, thus creating an unlevel playing field and unclear boundaries in
many circumstances; impediments to the implementation of innovations in
healthcare delivery and payment systems such as pay-for-performance,
shared savings, and bundled payments due to the lack of flexibility with
existing exceptions; and disproportionate consequences compounded by the
strict-liability provisions, as well as the complexity of the law which makes
non-compliance almost inevitable for many providers.14 0
Though participants acknowledged that opinion among AHLA members
regarding the various available options for restructuring the Stark Law
remains divided, a major theme found in comments made by these
participants was that the structure of the statute has made it "unworkable
given the dynamics of the healthcare industry."41
The proscriptive structure of the Stark Law requires the creation of an
exception for each and every permissible financial relationship. Given
the dynamics of the healthcare industry, the Law is destined to impede
changes that involve relationships that do not fit within existing
137. See Physicians' Referrals (Phase II), supra note 56 at 16,054; 42 C.F.R. §
411.354(c)(2)(i) (2010).
138. See Public Policy Discussion,supra note 6, at 1.
139. Id. at 2.
140. Id. at 3.
141. Id. at 6.
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exceptions. This, in turn, creates pressure for an ever increasing number
of exceptions, enhancing the complexity of the law and undermining the
industry's ability to understand and comply with its provisions. The
mechanical application of the Stark Law can also result in overpayment
liabilities that are highly disproportionate to the conduct giving rise to the
offense.142
Participants further noted that the Stark Law's structure creates greater
liability exposure for hospitals than for physicians against whom
enforcement is "almost nonexistent," thus further shifting the statute away
from its intended focus of prohibiting physicians from engaging in
inappropriate self-referral.143
This last point not only highlights the substantial burdens imposed by,
and dire potential consequences of, the law, but it also raises questions
regarding its effectiveness in combating fraud and abuse. While the AHLA
white paper cites the development of compliance mechanisms and enhanced
scrutiny of physician relationships on the part of hospitals and other
institutional providers, there has been no corresponding shift toward
compliance-focused behavior on the part of physicians.144
Another structural problem hampering the efficacy of the law noted by
the AHLA is the lack of a procedure by which hospitals could self-report
Stark Law violations to CMS, resulting in an atmosphere where providers
confronted with a violation feel as though they have been "thrust into a
vacuum with little practical guidance on how to best to address the
situation," exacerbating the problem and potentially exposing the provider
to "ruinous liability." 45
Yet another concern relating to the Stark Law's efficacy is the
availability of the in-office ancillary services exception, which allows
physicians affiliated with qualifying group practices to perform DHS that
are ancillary to the referring physician's professional services provided that
certain supervision, location and billing requirements are satisfied.146
Noting that the greatest financial interest physicians often have is in
services provided through their group practices, the AHLA expressed
concern that this exception is "inconsistent with the articulated purposes of
the legislation."' 47

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id. at 10.
Id.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 15-16.
42 C.F.R. § 411.355(b) (2010).
See Public Policy Discussion, supra note 6, at 7.
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A. The Kosenske Case
The Third Circuit's recent decision in United States ex rel. Kosenske v.
CarlisleHMA, Inc., exemplifies the complex nuances inherent in Stark Law
compliance as well as the draconian penalties that accompany even the
most well-intentioned violations.14 8 Brought as a qui tam action under the
False Claims Act by a former member of the anesthesiology group that
provided services to the hospital at issue, the relator alleged that Carlisle
Hospital submitted outpatient hospital claims to the Medicare program and
other federal healthcare programs, falsely certifying that such claims
complied with the Stark Law.149 The court found that the arrangement
between the anesthesiology group practice and the hospital implicated the
Stark Law and did not satisfy the personal services exception.so In 1992,
Carlisle Hospital (the hospital) negotiated an Anesthesiology Services
Agreement with a group of four physicians practicing as Blue Mountain
Anesthesia Associates (BMAA) under which BMAA would exclusively
provide all anesthesia services required by the hospital's patients as well as
pain-management services to be rendered at some point in the future.' 5 1
Specifically, the agreement provided that: 1) BMAA would provide
anesthesia coverage to hospital patients twenty-four hours a day, seven days
a week; 2) the hospital would provide space, personnel, equipment, and
supplies at no charge for BMAA to provide such anesthesiology services; 3)
BMAA would use the personnel, space, equipment, and supplies solely for
the practice of anesthesiology and pain-management for the hospital's
patients; 4) the hospital would not allow anyone other than BMAA
physicians to provide anesthesia or pain-management services at the
hospital; and 5) BMAA physicians would not practice anesthesia or painmanagement at any location other than the hospital or hospital-affiliated
site. 152
While the court noted that the agreement was "carefully drafted," it
pointed out that at the time the agreement was entered into, it only covered
anesthesia services provided at the hospital, as the group was not providing
pain management services at the time and did not begin doing so until
approximately fifteen months after the agreement was signed.153 In 1998,
the hospital opened a new outpatient facility approximately three miles
from the hospital at which BMAA provided pain-management services to

148.
(3d Cir.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

See generally United States ex rel. Kosenske v. Carlisle HMA, Inc., 554 F.3d 88
2009).
Id. at 91.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 92-93.
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patients.154 The hospital continued to provide space, equipment, and
support personnel at the new facility at no charge to BMAA.'
At the District Court level, it was determined that the numerous benefits
received by BMAA from the hospital constituted "remuneration" and
evidenced a "financial relationship" under the Stark Law.156 The District
Court further concluded, however, that the hospital's arrangement with
BMAA fell within the scope of the "personal service" exception
This exception excludes personal
enumerated in §1395nn(e)(3)(A).15'
services arrangements from the Stark Law's referral prohibition provided
the following key requirements are met: 1) the agreement is set out in
writing, signed by the parties and specifies and covers all of the services to
be provided by the physician; 2) the term of the arrangement is at least one
year; and 3) the compensation for the entire term is set in advance, does not
exceed fair market value, and does not take into account the volume or
value of referrals.158 Finding the original 1992 agreement between the
hospital and BMAA adequately addressed all anesthesiology and painmanagement services at the clinic, the Court also found that the
compensation provided to BMAA (including the provision of space,
personnel, and equipment) did not exceed fair market value because it was
the result of negotiation between unrelated parties.159
On review, the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court's finding that the
numerous benefits received by BMAA including the exclusive right to
practice all pain-management and anesthesia services and the receipt of
space, equipment, and support personnel constituted remuneration in-kind,
thus establishing a financial relationship for the purposes of the Stark
Law.16 0 The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the District Court's
finding that the arrangement between the hospital and BMAA, with regard
to the freestanding Pain Clinic, qualified for the personal services
exception, citing several factors.161
Initially, the court stated that the personal services exception "recognizes
that there can be personal service arrangements involving referrals that are
beneficial," and that the requirements of the exception protect against
abuses by "insisting on the transparency and verifiability that comes from
an express agreement reduced to writing and signed by the parties which
specifies all of the services to be provided by the physician and all of the
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Kosenske, 554 F.3d at 93.
Id.
Id. at 95.
Id. at 95-96.
Id. at 95.
Id. at 96.
Kosenske, 554 F.3d at 96.
Id.
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remuneration to be received for those services."l 6 2 In finding the 1992
agreement between BMAA and the hospital deficient for purposes of the
exception, the court outlined the following three factors.
First, the court held that the agreement did not apply to the provision of
pain management services at the new facility as the original agreement was
negotiated in 1992 in a wholly different context and as the freestanding
facility did not yet exist, BMAA was not providing any pain management
services at the time, and no free hospital space, staff or facilities were
devoted solely to pain management.16 3 Thus, the court concluded that the
opening of the freestanding pain clinic in 1998 constituted a "very
substantial change" from the circumstances contemplated in the original
agreement. 164
Secondly, the court noted that even if the original agreement could be
read as reflecting the arrangement between BMAA and the hospital with
regard to the freestanding pain clinic, it would nevertheless be deficient in
that the agreement failed to include any mention of the provision of office
space, equipment and staff necessary for the provision of pain management
services, let alone the pain clinic itself 165
Lastly, the court stated that it was "clear that there were no arm's length
negotiations that could vouch for the fair match of service and
compensation that the whole statutory scheme is designed to assure."l 66 As
a factual matter, the court first stated that negotiations that took place in
1992 "could not possibly reflect" the fair market value of the
aforementioned consideration given six years later and under the
"materially different circumstances" outlined above.' 6 7 As a legal matter,
the court further noted that, as BMAA and the hospital were both in a
position to generate business for each other, they were "interested parties,"
and thus any agreement negotiated between the two does not by definition
reflect fair market value.' 6 8
To the contrary, the Stark Act is predicated on the recognition that, where
one party is in a position to generate business for the other, negotiated
agreements between such parties are often designed to disguise the
payment of non-fair-market-value compensation.1 69
Furthermore, the court found that the addition of pain management
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id.
Id. at 96-97.
Id at 97.
Id.
Kosenske, 554 F.3d at 97.
Id.
Id.
Id
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services fundamentally altered the relationship between BMAA and the
hospital, as the introduction of these services allowed BMAA to refer its
pain clinic patients to the hospital for other diagnostic tests and treatments,
unlike its arrangement to provide anesthesiology services where the
referrals were being made to BMAA from the hospital.17 e This factor
presented to the court "the same concerns" that motivated the Stark Law,
thus necessitating the finding that the hospital failed to sufficiently
demonstrate its right to the personal services exception.171
Apart from calling into question the common practice of hospitals
providing free space, equipment and personnel to physicians, the Kosenske
case also highlights the drastic nature of the liability that hospitals face for
violating the Stark Law. Under the applicable penalties outlined in
subsection (g), Carlisle Hospital would potentially be required to refund any
and all amounts collected for any services billed pursuant to the tainted
referrals from BMAA of pain clinic patients to the hospital,17 2 pay a penalty
of $15,000 per each service billed pursuant to a tainted referral that has not
been fully refunded,17 3 and potentially become excluded from the Medicare
and Medicaid programs,174 which would be tantamount to a death sentence
for a hospital.
Considered a rare judicial foray into the Stark Law, this decision has
been regarded with interest by many throughout the healthcare community
who see the opinion as raising several caution flags over common
arrangements between physicians and hospitals, such as the provision of
space, equipment, and staffing at no charge to physicians who provide
services to patients in hospital departments and clinics.17 5 Following this
decision, the large looming question is whether hospitals and physicians
must enter into a written agreement that complies with the Stark Law's fair
market value requirement whenever a hospital provides the use of space,
equipment, and staffing to a physician, regardless of whether the physician
is paid by the hospital for their services. Furthermore, this question
prompts the difficult query of how to compute fair market value in light of
the inclusion of these items and, in turn, whether physicians are now
required to compensate the hospital for the use of hospital-provided space,
equipment and staffing in order to comply with the fair market value
requirement.
170. Id.
171. Kosenske, 554 F.3d at 98.
172. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (g)(2) (2010).
173. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (g)(3).
174. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (g)(4).
175. Amy Lynn Sorrel, Court issues rare Stark ruling on physician-hospitalagreement,
AM. MED. NEWS, (Feb. 16, 2009), http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2009/02/16/gvsb
0216.htm.
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Despite the court's ruling to the contrary, there remains the interesting
question as to whether the provision of space, equipment and staffing truly
constitute remuneration to physicians, especially in light of the fact that
under Medicare reimbursement mechanisms both the hospital and physician
are paid fees based on the technical and professional components of their
Because the hospital's reimbursement under
respective services.176
Medicare includes a "facility fee" component that includes compensation
for the space, equipment and staffing utilized by physicians, and physicians
cannot provide professional services to hospital patients without the use of
such items, the question remains as to whether the court's decision was
correct, especially in light of the significant practical effects that the
decision will have on hospital-physician relationships. 7 7
Additionally, the case highlights the intricacies of Stark Law compliance
and the drastic consequences of failing to satisfy the Law's strict standards.
As one practitioner in the fraud and abuse area observed, "The message is,
it doesn't matter how reasonable and defensible the underlying arrangement
is if you don't meet all of the requirements."178 Under the sanctions made
available by subsection (g) of the Stark Law, Carlisle faces potential
penalties of a truly staggering and vertiginous nature, such as being forced
to go back and refund every claim submitted to the Medicare program
resulting from a referral of BMAA pain-clinic patients to the hospital for
DHS, not to mention the possible imposition of a fine and exclusion.17 9
Another interesting aspect of the Kosenske case is the fact that it was
initiated by a whistle-blower who was formerly a member of BMAA, the
anesthesiology practice at issue. This is an additional liability risk for
hospitals and physicians. Under the False Claims Act, providers who
submit claims to Medicare for reimbursement certify that such claims are
submitted in conformity with federal law, including the Stark Law.so The
fact that this action was brought by a whistleblower is significant,
especially in light of the fact that the government did not intervene in the
case, and hospitals and physicians may find that the Kosenske decision may
prompt more whistleblower claims based on alleged Stark Law violations
under the False Claims Act.''

176. Karl Schmitz, Appeals Court Decision Questions Hospital Practice of Providing
Free Use of Space, Equipment, Staff to Physicians, HEALTH L. PERSP. (Hooper, Lundy &
Bookman) May 2009, at 2, available at http://health-law.com/wp-content/uploads/
2009/PDF/hlp_05.pdf.
177. Id.
178. See Sorrel, supra note 175 (quoting Jeffrey P. Drummond, a healthcare regulator
expert and partner with Jackson Walker LLP in Dallas).
179. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(g)(2)-(4) (2010).
180. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2010).
181. See Sorrel supra note 175.
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Despite the arguments that Kosenske was incorrectly decided, that it left
various unanswered questions in its wake, or that it will have significant
unintended consequences on the healthcare community, the decision
nevertheless recognizes the crux of what the Stark Law attempts to
accomplish and perhaps unintentionally provides a good focal point for
efforts to reform it. While the District Court concluded that the provision
of space, equipment, and staffing constituted remuneration and thus created
a financial relationship between BMAA and the hospital, it found not only
that the written agreement was sufficient to meet the personal services
exception, but also that the arrangement did not violate the law since the
original negotiated agreement reflected fair market value.1 8 2
In reversing this determination, the Third Circuit recognized that the
concept of fair market value and the concomitant notion of arm's length
transactions are crucial components of the Stark Law's prohibition of selfreferral. It further recognized that the Stark Law is "predicated" upon the
recognition that parties in a position to generate business for one another (as
BMAA was by virtue of bringing its own patients into the pain-clinic) often
utilize negotiated agreements as a way to disguise the payment of
compensation (e.g., valuable non-monetary consideration like the provision
of office space, equipment, and staff) that exceeds fair market value and
evidences an unspoken understanding that these items are provided in
exchange for a steady stream of referrals.1 83
Through this recognition, the Third Circuit may have unwittingly
supplied a particularly insightful call to reform the Stark Law. First,
Kosenske can perhaps be viewed as a microcosm of the Stark universe, as
this case highlights the focus and aims of the law, the complexity and
uncertainty that accompany efforts to comply with it, and the drastic
consequences that follow failure to achieve strict technical compliance with
the law's requirements.
At a basic level, this case concerned a dispute over whether a written
agreement between a hospital and a group of providers complied with the
requirements provided by an exception to the Stark Law, which was
designed to ensure transparency and verifiability for referrals between a
provider and an entity in which the referring provider has a financial
interest. 184 Viewed entirely at this level, the decision appears problematic
and possibly even absurd considering the severe consequences and the
absence of any evidence suggesting that noncompliance resulted from
willfulness or a scheme to circumvent the law.

182. See United States ex rel. Kosenske v. Carlisle HMA, Inc., 554 F.3d 88, 96-97 (3d
Cir. 2009).
183. Id. at 97.
184. See Public Policy Discussion, supra note 6, at 14.

http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol20/iss1/4

28

Sutton: The Stark Law in Retrospect

Stark Law

2011]

43

In its treatment of the fair market value concept, however, the Third
Circuit demonstrates recognition of the key premise that drives the law namely, that relationships between parties in a position to generate business
for one another preclude the availability of truly arm's length transactions
that ensure compensation remains within the bounds of fair market value.
This, in turn, ensures that there are no improper financial incentives present
for providers to make unnecessary referrals, which have the effect of
skewing a physician's professional judgment and endangering the Medicare
and Medicaid programs through the over-utilization of services.' 85
This recognition on the part of the Third Circuit begs the question as to
whether the Stark Law is properly focused. Although much of this case
focused on whether the arrangement between BMAA and Carlisle Hospital
met a regulatory exception, it seems clear that the court's determination
hinged on the nature of the relationship between the parties in light of the
establishment of the free-standing pain clinic. Thus, the question that
Kosenske prompts is whether the policy concerns that underlie the Stark
Law would be better served by focusing on addressing specific types of
financial relationships that are prone to abuse (e.g., those that preclude the
ability to transact business at arms length) rather than including all types of
relationships, thereby necessitating the crafting of numerous exceptions for
legitimate arrangements or those that pose a lesser risk for abuse.
IV. RESTRUCTURING THE STARK LAW

A. Shifting the Focus of the Law
The AHLA White Paper lists "Reverse the Premise" first and foremost
among the options for restructuring the Stark Law, advocating that the
focus of the Stark Law "shift from fitting all financial relationships within
exceptions to defining a list of prohibited financial relationships that
physicians must avoid," and further stating that "it would be fairer and more
effective for the Stark Law to define the relationships deemed to be abusive
and specifically prohibit those relationships."' 8 6 While the white paper does
not provide a list of specific relationships that should be prohibited due to
their propensity for abuse, a few problematic arrangements can be gleaned
from previous studies regarding physician self-referral abuse, including
physician ownership of clinical and physiological laboratories,187 outpatient
diagnostic imaging facilities,' 8 8 and certain ancillary services such as

185.
186.
187.
188.

See id
See id. at 11-12.
See FinancialArrangements, supra note 15, at 21.
See Hillman, supra note 34, at 1605-06.
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durable medical equipment.'8 9
Additionally, certain financial relationships recognized by CMS as
improperly influencing physician referrals, such as "under arrangements" or
"per click" lease agreements, should be prohibited as well. Although the
AHLA White Paper expressed doubts regarding the ability of CMS to craft
a list of problematic financial relationships,' 90 the agency did take steps in
2008 to address several types of financial relationships prone to abuse.' 9'
First, in the rules promulgated regarding the Medicare Inpatient
Prospective Payment System for 2009, CMS revised the Stark Law's
exceptions for space and equipment leases to prohibit "per-click"
arrangements,' 92 by which either space or equipment is leased to a
physician on a per service or percentage of revenue basis instead of a fixed
amount.'93 In the preamble to the final rule, CMS noted, "such lease
arrangements create the incentive for over-utilization, because the more
referrals the physician lessor makes, the more revenue he or she eams."' 94
Second, as described earlier in Part II, CMS also revised the definition of
"entity" to prohibit "under arrangements," 95 which were previously a way
for physician specialists such as radiologists, oncologists, cardiologists, and
urologists to share in the technical fees hospitals received via
reimbursement for treatment that, under normal circumstances, only
resulted in professional reimbursement.' 9 6
If the premise of the Stark Law is reversed, thus obviating the need for
the myriad of exceptions to the self-referral prohibition (a fact particularly
lamented by Rep. Stark),' 97 the Stark Law can be streamlined to root out the
problematic arrangements and practices that are inconsistent with the intent
of the law. Although many critics have taken issue with the approach used
by CMS to issuing regulations under the Stark Law (an admittedly slow
process which produced a patchwork of confusing and often inconsistent
regulations), these problems may be due more to the Stark Law's over189. See FinancialArrangements, supra note 15, at 21.
190. See Public Policy Discussion, supra note 6, at 12-13.
191. See generally Changes, supra note 58.
192. Id. at 48,714.
193. McDermott, Will & Emery, CMS Finalizes Stark Rule Changes in Final 2009
Inpatient PPS Rule, Aug. 11, 2008, http://www.mwe.com/index.cfm/fuseaction/
publications.nldetail/object id/3f62ec87-f675-438b-9de8-b97562b576c7.cfm (last visited
Nov. 10, 2010).
194. Scott Becker et al., II Key Concepts from the Stark Law, BECKER'S ASC REV.,
Mar.-Apr. 2009, at 1, 8, available at http://www.beckersasc.com/news-analysis/11-keyconcepts-from-the-stark-law.html.
195. See Changes, supra note 58, at 48,713.
196. Daniel Murphy, New Stark Regulation Will Eliminate Most Under Arrangements
Joint Ventures, BIRMINGHAM MED. NEWS, available at http://www.birminghammedical

news.com/news.php?viewStory= 1164.
197. See Whelan, supra note 7.
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inclusive structure rather than the inability of CMS to adequately address
the issue of self-referral. Concentrating on certain relationships and
arrangements prone to abuse would also substantially reduce the burdens
related to achieving compliance with the Stark Law for legitimate
arrangements and relationships that currently have to seek the shelter of an
exception due to the structure of the law.
B. Adjusting the Medicare Reimbursement System
When addressing Congress in support of his bill to expand the Stark Law
into a comprehensive ban on self-referral (H.R. 345), Rep. Stark stated:
"Our system of financing and organizing medical care has led to
uncontrolled increases in medical spending and a large ineffective
utilization review bureaucracy. These problems are exacerbated because
we have tolerated, even encouraged, perverse financial incentives for
doctors." 9 8 With the consideration in mind that the Stark Law addresses
issues beyond that of consumer protection, namely the over-utilization of
medical services that threaten the continued sustainability of the taxpayerfunded Medicare and Medicaid programs, another avenue by which to
address self-referral abuse is the modification of the Medicare
reimbursement system, an idea that enjoyed widespread support from the
AHLA constituents involved in the white paper, as the most effective
While adjusting
means for controlling utilization and costs.' 9 9
reimbursement mechanisms is currently touted as an integral part of
arresting the continuing rapid increases in healthcare costs in the United
States, 200 it may also be a way to address the issue of self-referral by
removing financial incentives for physicians to refer patients for medically
unnecessary services.
Among the possible reform options listed by the AHLA were: 1)
decreasing reimbursement for all ancillary services provided through a
physician's group practice; 2) adopting a declining reimbursement formula
for particular high volume services ("on the theory that the provider's
margin increases dramatically above a certain volume threshold"); 3)
decreasing payments for high margin services (and service lines); 4)
limiting the number of entities that are eligible to bill for certain lucrative
services by implementing more stringent credentialing requirements; and 5)
adopting a bundled payment system.20'
While "bundled payments" are an emerging trend as well as a hot-button
198. See CPORA, supra note 44.
199. See Public Policy Discussion, supra note 6, at 8.
200. Public Policy Discussion, supra note 6, at 8; See also Manoj Jain, A Little Less
Autonomy in Billing, Please, WASH. POST, Mar. 9, 2010, at HE01.
201. Public Policy Discussion, supra note 6, at 8.
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issue in the context of national healthcare reform that may represent a
viable way of combating surging healthcare costs on a widespread scale, a
more narrowly tailored solution is perhaps an appropriate way to address
Despite the contention that implementing
self-referral abuse.
reimbursement reform globally may pose a difficult and arduous
undertaking, it is nevertheless possible to bundle payments in certain areas
especially prone to self-referral abuse. For instance, critics of the Stark
Law often point to the in-office ancillary services exception, which permits
the furnishing of certain DHS in the office of a physician's group practice
that are ancillary to the referring physician's professional services where
certain supervision, location and billing requirements are satisfied, as being
an enormous loophole. The availability of this exception is seemingly
contrary to the purposes of the Law, as it essentially permits physicians to
engage in practices within the confines of a group practice that they would
otherwise be prohibited from engaging in with outside entities.2 0 2
Consequently, one way to immediately address the problem of
physicians over-utilizing ancillary services is to either decrease the
reimbursement for certain ancillary services that are determined to be atrisk for over-utilization from a statistical standpoint or shifting to a bundled
payment system for reimbursing office visits at a flat amount instead of
allowing physicians to bill for ancillary services on a per-service basis.
C. Implementing a Self-Disclosure Protocol
Another factor exacerbating the potentially drastic consequences that
flow from a violation of the Stark Law is that there is currently no protocol
by which a physician, hospital, or other entity could disclose an uncovered
potential violation without becoming exposed to potentially ruinous
liability. As the AHLA White Paper states: "Under existing law [CMS]
believes it lacks the authority to seek less than a complete repayment of the
reimbursement paid for services provided pursuant to a prohibited
referral."203
Thankfully, the recent healthcare reform legislation addressed this issue
by mandating that the Department of Health and Human Services
202. Am. Coll. of Radiology, InappropriateUtilization of Diagnostic Medical Imaging
Modalities, available at http://www.acr.org/SecondaryMainMenuCategories/GREcon/
FeaturedCategories/congressional/FederalLegislativelssues/InappropriateUtilizationofDiagn
("While this
osticMedicallmagingModalitiesDoc2.aspx (last visited Dec. 5, 2010).
exception is designed to protect physicians who provide certain designated health services
that are generally ancillary to the medical service provided by their practice, the ACR is
deeply concerned that this exception has become the rule and serves as a damaging
loophole. Current data demonstrates that costs associated with the volume of diagnostic
medical imaging services are increasing faster than that of prescription drugs and three times
faster than all other physician services.").
203. See PublicPolicy Discussion,supra note 6, at 15.
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implement a self-disclosure protocol for actual or potential Stark Law
violations.204 While the details and structure of the protocol remains to be
seen, it appears that HHS will have the authority to impose fines (rather
than to demand repayment in full) for violations considering such factors as
the extent and nature of the violation, the timeliness of the disclosure, the
cooperation of the parties involved, and other appropriate factors.205 This
will have the effect of somewhat lessening the liability for physicians,
hospitals, and other entities that achieve less than full compliance with the
Stark Law's requirements without malicious intentions.
V. CONCLUSION
In the words of Rep. Stark,
To achieve workable healthcare reform, the United States will need to
adopt new policies and institutions for physicians' conflict of interest ...
Physicians' conflicts of interest go far beyond issues of professional
ethics. They are a central part of why our healthcare system needs to be
reformed. Addressing such conflicts is an integral part of the federal
government's responsibility to protect patients, ensure access to health
care, control costs and promote quality.206
However, the broad consensus among the healthcare community is that
at best, the Stark Law has become a morass that is virtually unworkable due

to its breadth and complexity, and at worst, a law with drastic unintended
consequences that somewhat ironically stands in the way of innovations
which have the potential to enhance patient safety and reduce the cost of

health care.207
Unfortunately, our experience with this piece of legislation is not unlike
that of Heracles, the hero of classical Greek antiquity, and the Hydra, a
terrifying nine-headed monster that grew two more heads for each one
It seems that for every potentially abusive practice or
severed.208
relationship addressed, we have experienced not a disentanglement from,
but a progressive knotting into 20 9 the difficulties the Stark Law was
intended to address. As Rep. Stark himself conceded, the Stark Law's
complexity is due primarily to its structure,21 o which necessitates even
legitimate business arrangements to seek an exception. To state the matter

204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

See PPACA, supra note 110, at § 6409(a).
PPACA, supra note I10, at § 6409(b).
See CPORA, supra note 44.
See Wales, supra note 5, at 21-23.
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succinctly, the Stark Law is a poor fit for the dynamic and complex
healthcare industry.
This is not to say that the concern over the problem of inappropriate selfreferral is illegitimate, quite the opposite. As Dr. Atul Gawande's
influential piece "The Cost Conundrum" suggests, however, the wider
problem of over-utilization of medical services in this country may be due
more to the financial incentives offered by our current system of payment
than any other factor. 2 1 1 It is not much of a stretch to suggest that the same
logic might apply to the problem of inappropriate self-referral, which is
nestled into the wider problem of over-utilization like a matryoshka doll.
Accordingly, to address this problem in the most effective manner
available, as well as in the least intrusive manner possible (so as not to
disproportionately affect legitimate business arrangements within the
healthcare industry), the Stark Law should be reformed to prohibit only
those arrangements and relationships that empirical evidence demonstrate
are prone to abuse. Concomitantly, reimbursement mechanisms should be
reformed so that either: 1) payments are distributed based on an episode of
care rather than a separate fee for each performed; or 2) payment levels are
decreased for services for which empirical evidence demonstrates are overutilized.
If the aim of the Stark Law is to regulate the behavior of physicians with
respect to inappropriately referring patients for medically unnecessary
treatments, its current structure is a rather roundabout way of accomplishing
it. To truly change the practice of inappropriate self-referral as well as the
culture of over-utilization, it is necessary not only to target specific
relationships and practices prone to abuse, but to realign the financial
incentives created by our current payment mechanisms as well.

211.

See generally, Atul Gawande, The Cost Conundrum, NEW YORKER, June 1, 2009.
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